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Abstract 
This study considers the acquisition of epistemic modal auxiliaries (EMA) in typically 
developing (TD) and autistic children and the role that Theory of Mind (ToM) plays in this 
development. Nineteen Dutch-speaking TD children and ten autistic children received tasks 
assessing ToM, general linguistic ability and EMA comprehension. Results suggest that both 
groups have some understanding of the Dutch EMA system, but no significant differences 
were found between groups. However, once participants were divided into ToM passers and 
ToM failers irrespective of clinical diagnosis, results showed that passers performed 
significantly better than failers on EMA understanding. Having a good understanding of 
others’ mental states, as evidenced by full marks on ToM tasks, thus seems important in the 
acquisition of EMA. 
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1. Introduction 
 
If we assume that an average English-speaking adult knows around 60,000 words 
and that children start to learn words around their first birthday, this means that 
the child has to learn an average of around 10 new words a day every day until 
she reaches adulthood (Bloom, 2000, 2002). Exactly how children are capable of 
this stunning accomplishment is not entirely clear, but many researchers agree that 
children’s understanding of other people’s intentions is a fundamental part of the 
word learning process (Baldwin, 1993; Baldwin & Moses, 2001; de Villiers, 2007; 
Happé & Loth, 2002). The aim of this paper is to investigate to what extent the 
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development of Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to explicitly reason about 
others’ (potentially false) beliefs (Perner, Leekam & Wimmer, 1987), is related to 
the child’s understanding of epistemic modal auxiliaries (e.g. must, might, may) 
that refer to an understanding of the speaker’s belief for their interpretation.  
 
1.1. Theory of Mind and the acquisition of epistemic modal auxiliaries 
 
Epistemic modal auxiliaries such as the italicised words in 1) and 2) relate to how 
strongly the speaker is committed to the truth of a proposition. In other words: 
what degree of belief the speaker has in her utterance (Papafragou, 1998).  
 
(1) The keys must be in the drawer 
(2) It may be raining  
 
In Example 1), use of the modal auxiliary ‘must’ indicates that the speaker is very 
certain of the location of the keys and hence strongly believes they are in the 
drawer; use of ‘may’, on the other hand, indicates a considerably less strong belief 
in the truth of the statement.  
Various studies have looked at young children’s understanding of modal 
auxiliaries. Hirst and Weil (1982), for instance, considered three- to six-year-old 
children’s understanding of the modals ‘must’, ‘may’ and ‘should’ and found that 
only the oldest children (starting at 5;6) could make strength distinctions between 
the modals, a result that was replicated in a more recent study by Noveck, Ho and 
Sera (1996). Similarly, in Moore, Pure and Furrow (1990)’s study of the epistemic 
modal auxiliaries ‘must’, ‘might’ and ‘could’, even the oldest children (six-year-
olds) did not demonstrate ceiling performance, although this study did find 
significant improvement in the understanding of these terms between the ages of 
three and four. Studies assessing comprehension of epistemic modal auxiliaries in 
English-speaking children thus generally find basic comprehension of these terms 
when children are around five years old. The few studies that have been conducted 
with children acquiring languages other than English point to a similar age of 
acquisition range. For instance, De Mulder (2015) demonstrates that Dutch-
speaking four- and five-year-olds have some understanding of the contrasts 
between the Dutch modal auxiliaries moeten ‘must be’ and kunnen ‘may be’, 
although the five-year-olds did not yet demonstrate ceiling performance. 
However, Bascelli and Barbieri’s (2002) study on the Italian modal auxiliaries 
dovere ‘must’ and potere ‘may’ found a somewhat later age of acquisition as basic 
comprehension was only present in six-year-olds, with development still 
continuing in eight-year-olds.  
These studies thus suggest that a dawning understanding of epistemic modals 
begins at around four years old with development continuing for at least a number 
of years more. Given how understanding of these terms would seem to rely on the 
child’s capacity to understand ‘the mind behind the speech’, one factor that might 
be important in the acquisition of these vocabulary items is the child’s ToM 
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development. A number of previous studies have considered whether there is a 
relationship between the acquisition of ‘mental’ areas of language and the 
development of ToM. Moore et al. (1990), for example, looked at four-year-olds’ 
understanding of both mental state verbs (‘know’ and ‘think’) and modal 
auxiliaries (‘must’ and ‘might’) and demonstrated that the children’s 
understanding of the mental terms was related to their understanding of beliefs. 
Similarly, De Mulder (2015) found an association between the understanding of 
mental state verbs, modal auxiliaries and modal adjuncts and ToM development 
in typically developing Dutch-speaking four- and five-year-olds. Furthermore, 
Papafragou (2001), Papafragou and Li (2001) and Ifantidou (2005) have all argued 
that children’s acquisition of evidential markers (the linguistic encoding of 
information source), is constrained by the development of ToM, in particular the 
understanding of the source of beliefs and speaker certainty.  
 
1.2. Acquiring mental state terms when ToM development is impaired 
 
Although previous research thus suggests that there is a relationship between the 
development of mental areas of language and the child’s ToM development in 
typically developing children, the existence of this relationship would be more 
robustly supported by demonstrating that impairment in ToM development is 
associated with an impairment in mental language development. In this sense then, 
it is insightful to consider to what extent the development of mental language in 
autistic children is comparable to that of typically developing children. It is 
generally assumed that many autistic children are specifically impaired in their 
ability to appreciate the mental states of others (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 
1985; Frith, 2003; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992; Yirmiya, Erel, Shaked & Solomonica-
Levi, 1998). They typically fail to take into account the speaker’s focus of 
attention when she utters a novel word, leading to problems in lexical acquisition 
(Baron-Cohen, Baldwin & Crowson, 1997) and, when they are older, they also 
tend to fail standard ToM tasks that typically developing children start to pass at 
around four years old. If autistic children thus show a delay or impairment in their 
understanding of mental language as compared to typically developing children, 
this would support the suggestion that children rely on their understanding of 
beliefs in order to fully understand vocabulary items that relate to mental states. 
Following this line of reasoning, various studies have investigated the 
development of mental language in individuals with autism. Ziatas, Durkin and 
Pratt (1998), for instance, considered the development of the mental state verbs 
‘know’, ‘think’ and ‘guess’ in relation to false belief understanding and found 
autistic children to perform significantly worse than typically developing children. 
This finding is consistent with various other studies. For instance, Tager-Flusberg 
(1992) demonstrates that autistic children use significantly less cognitive mental 
state language in comparison to language-matched children with Down syndrome, 
Baron-Cohen et al. (1994) suggest that autistic children are impaired in their 
recognition of mental state terms as compared to mentally handicapped children 
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and Kazak, Collis and Lewis’ (1997) found that autistic children were impaired in 
their ability to understand the mental state terms ‘know’ and ‘guess’.  
It should be noted, however, that not all studies that have investigated mental 
language use in autistic populations have found deficits. The four high-
functioning Dutch-speaking autistic adults assessed in De Roeck and Nuyts (1994, 
cited in Papafragou, 2002), for instance, displayed typical use of three markers of 
epistemic modality in their spontaneous speech (the adjective/adverb 
waarschijnlijk ‘probable’ or ‘probably’, the mental state verb denken ‘think’ and 
the modal auxiliary kunnen ‘can/may’). This finding suggests that at least certain 
autistic individuals may be able to acquire various domains of mental language. 
However, De Roeck and Nuyts’ study does not mention performance on standard 
ToM tasks for these participants. Given the finding that high-functioning autistic 
individuals do tend to be able to pass standard ToM tasks at some point 
(Frith & Happé, 1994; Happé, 1993), it is possible that these adults actually have 
attained an understanding of others’ beliefs that is sufficient for proficient mental 
state language use (see also Papafragou, 2002).  
Although previous studies thus suggest that there is a relationship between 
ToM development and the comprehension of mental state language, additional 
studies that assess both ToM ability and mental state language understanding in 
autistic and typically developing children would be useful to determine what role 
ToM has to play in the development of mental language. The current study adds 
to previous studies in that the sample of autistic children is relatively young (six-
year-olds) as compared to similar studies and their understanding of Dutch 
epistemic modal auxiliaries is investigated, whereas many other studies in this 
domain focus on English and mental state verbs. If, despite these differences, the 
current study also demonstrates that children with a ToM deficit show an 
impairment in their understanding of mental language, this would serve to 
underscore the importance of ToM development in the acquisition of mental state 
language. 
 
 
2. Method 
 
2.1. Participants 
 
Nineteen Dutch-speaking typically developing children (11 girls and 8 boys) 
between ages 6;0 and 7;0 (M = 6;5 years) and ten Dutch-speaking autistic children 
(2 girls and 8 boys) between ages 5;1 and 8;4 (M = 6;11 years) participated in this 
study. The two groups did not differ significantly in age (t(27) = -1.88; p = .18).  
According to school records, all the children in the autistic group had been 
clinically diagnosed with a disorder in the autistic spectrum as assessed by medical 
specialists in the Netherlands using DSM-IV criteria (three children were 
diagnosed with PDD-NOS, seven with autistic disorder). The children in this 
group were all attending either special schools or special programmes within 
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regular schools catered to autistic children. Children in the autistic group were 
included in the study if they were aged between five and eight years old and if 
they were willing to participate. The autistic sample was recruited from four 
different schools; the typically developing children all came from one regular 
primary school. The teachers of the typically developing group reported that none 
of them had any identified disorders or impairments, nor was there any suspicion 
of possible disorders. 
In order to be able to pinpoint a specific difference in mental language ability, 
it was important to ensure that the autistic and the typically developing children 
had comparable linguistic ability outside of the mental domain. To this end, two 
language tasks, testing receptive vocabulary and language comprehension at the 
sentential level, were incorporated in the assessment. Receptive vocabulary was 
assessed using the Dutch version of the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test III 
(PPVT, Schlichting, 2005) and an abbreviated version of the Reynell test for 
language comprehension (van Eldik, Schlichting, lutje Spelberg, van der Meulen 
& van der Meulen, 1995) was employed to measure sentential language 
comprehension. Independent t-tests demonstrated that the autistic children were 
comparable to the typically developing children regarding language ability outside 
of the mental domain (vocabulary: t(27) = -1.19; p = .25; sentential language 
comprehension: t(27) = -1.21; p = .24). 
 
2.2. Procedure 
 
Children were tested individually in a separate room in their school building. For 
the typically developing children, two adults were present throughout the session. 
The data from the typically developing children was a subset of a larger dataset, 
approximately 30 minutes of which relates to the data presented in this paper. The 
autistic children received one session of approximately 30 minutes in which the 
data reported on here were gathered (some additional tasks were also included in 
this session, but are not reported on further). Children in the typically developing 
group received various different testing orders; children in the autistic group 
received a set order (ToM, vocabulary, understanding of modal terms and 
sentential language comprehension). For practical reasons, it was not possible to 
have two adults present for the autistic group, so only one experimenter conducted 
the testing for the autistic children. All children received stickers in return for their 
participation. 
 
2.3. Materials 
 
2.3.1. Epistemic modal auxiliaries 
This task employed a test design very similar to the one used in Ziatas et al. (1998). 
Children were shown two boxes (one red, one blue) in which a sticker could be 
hidden. Two puppets gave the child information on the location of the sticker by 
using the Dutch epistemic modal auxiliaries moeten ‘must be’, zullen ‘shall be’ 
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and kunnen ‘may be’ contrastively (see Example 3). To find the sticker, children 
had to prefer the box referred to by moeten (‘must be’) over the one referred to by 
zullen (‘shall be’) or kunnen (‘may be’) and the box referred to with zullen (‘shall 
be’) over the one with kunnen (‘may be’)1. 
 
(3) De sticker moet/zal/kan wel2 in de rode doos liggen 
 The sticker must/shall/may [interjection] in the red box lie 
 ‘The sticker must/shall/may be in the red box’ 
 
In six trials each contrastive pair was used twice. Children were not allowed to 
look inside the boxes in between trials. Prior to the test trials, two practice trials 
were included in which one puppet stated simply where the sticker was (de sticker 
ligt in de rode doos, ‘the sticker is in the red box’) and the other puppet stated 
where the sticker was not (de sticker ligt niet in de blauwe doos, ‘the sticker is not 
in the blue box’). The child received a sticker for each of the practice trials and 
was promised more stickers if she played the game and paid attention. 
 
2.3.2. Theory of Mind 
Two different types of false belief tasks were conducted (separated by an 
additional task that is not reported on further): a location change task (Wimmer & 
Perner, 1983) and an unexpected contents task (Perner et al., 1987). In the location 
change task, children were told a story in which a marble is initially placed in a 
blue box by a doll named Laura, but is later placed in a red box, unbeknownst to 
Laura. On Laura’s return, the child is asked to predict and explain Laura’s 
searching behaviour (‘Where will Laura look for the marble?’ and ‘Why will she 
look there?’). A maximum of two points could be scored on this task. For the 
explanation question, answers were scored correct if they referred to the original 
location of the object or the character’s belief regarding the location of the object. 
Two control questions pertaining to the first and the final location of the marble 
were also included to ensure that the child had understood the story and 
remembered the key events.  
For the unexpected contents task, children were introduced to a new doll and 
told that he would like to play a game with them, but that he was too tired at the 
moment. The child was then shown a familiar container (an egg box) and asked 
what was in it. Once the expected answer had been given, the true contents of the 
box, a toy car, were shown. The box was then closed again and the child was asked 
three test questions: ‘When you first saw the box, what did you say was in it?’ 
(assessing the child’s own false belief), ‘What will the doll say is in this box when 
we ask him what’s in it?’ (assessing the doll’s false belief ) and ‘Why will the doll 
                                                          
1  14 Dutch-speaking adults also completed this task and demonstrated that they performed at 
ceiling with a 96,8% accuracy rate. The difference in speaker certainty conveyed by the three 
modal terms used here is thus robust for adult speakers of Dutch. 
2  The interjection ‘wel’ doesn’t add a specific meaning to the sentence, but it serves to make the 
whole sentence sound more natural. 
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say that?’ (assessing their ability to explain the doll’s false belief). It should be 
noted that none of the ToM questions contained mental state verbs, so that lack of 
understanding of these terms would not hinder performance. Three points could 
be scored for this task. Answers to the explanation question were scored correct if 
they referred to the box’ misleading appearance or the doll’s mistaken belief 
regarding the contents of the box. A control question pertaining to the actual 
contents of the box was included to ensure children had remembered this aspect 
of the story. 
 
 
3. Results 
 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics specified separately for the typically 
developing and the autistic children. 
 
Table 1. Means, SD and ranges for TD (N = 19) and autistic (N = 10) groups 
 
Typically developing   Autistic 
Mean SD Range  Mean SD Range 
Age (months) 77 3.85 72 -84  83 11.63 61-100 
ToM-LC 2 0 2  1.4 0.84 0-2 
ToM-UC 2.58 0.77 1-3  1 1.16 0-3 
ToM total 4.58 0.77 3-5  2.4 1.71 0-5 
LC-Vocab 94.21 13.44 68-120  100.8 15.59 75-120 
LC-Sent  24.47 2.67 19-28  26.3 5.54 14-33 
Epistemic terms 4 1.41 2-6  3.7 0.68 3-5 
 
Note. SD: Standard Deviation; TD: Typically Developing; ToM-LC: ToM location change; ToM-
UC: ToM unexpected contents; LC-Vocab: Language Comprehension-Vocabulary; LC-Sent: 
Language Comprehension Sentential. Maximum scores: ToM location change = 2; ToM unexpected 
contents = 3; ToM total score = 5; no vocabulary maximum; Sentence comprehension = 34; 
Epistemic terms = 6 
 
Children could receive a score of six for their understanding of epistemic modal 
auxiliaries, with a score of three indicating chance performance (children could 
choose between two boxes). Although, as expected, the autistic children scored 
significantly lower on the ToM tasks than the typically developing children (t(27) 
= 4.76; p =.003; r = .68)3, unexpectedly, there was no significant difference 
between the two groups in their understanding of epistemic modal auxiliaries 
(t(27) = 0.63; p = .45). The typically developing children had a somewhat higher 
mean score than the autistic children (4 vs. 3.7 respectively), but this difference 
was not significant. Additional analyses demonstrated that both groups were 
performing better than would be expected on the basis of chance (t(18) = 3.08; p 
                                                          
3  r indicates Pearson’s correlation coefficient r as a measure of effect size. All reported effect 
sizes are larger than .50 indicating a large effect (see Field, 2005). 
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= .006; r = .59 for the typically developing children and t(9) = 3.28; p = .01; r = 
.74 for the autistic children). These results thus suggest that both groups of 
children have at least some understanding of the contrasts between the three 
different epistemic modal auxiliaries employed in this task, although scores were 
not yet at ceiling level, indicating that development in this domain is still in 
progress at six years old. Furthermore, the lack of difference in performance 
between the two groups suggests that the autistic children are not impaired in this 
domain of mental language ability as compared to typically developing children 
of the same age and general verbal ability.  
While this result is initially surprising, an explanation may lie in the ToM 
performance of the children in both groups. As the ranges for the ToM total score 
demonstrate, not all typically developing children passed all the ToM tasks and 
not all the autistic children failed them. In fact, five out of 19 typically developing 
children did not answer all ToM questions correctly and one out of the ten autistic 
children did give the right answer to all ToM questions. This thus entailed that the 
initial assumption underlying this study (i.e., that the six-year-old autistic children 
would all display a marked ToM deficit, whereas the typically developing six-
year-old children were expected to perform well on the ToM tasks), was not borne 
out by the data. Potentially then, if the children are divided into groups dependent 
on their performance on the ToM tasks, regardless of clinical diagnosis, lesser 
performance on ToM tasks would turn out to be related to problems in 
understanding epistemic modal auxiliaries. In order to consider this possibility, an 
additional analysis was thus conducted. In this analysis the performance of ToM 
‘passers’, that is, the 15 children, 14 typically developing and one autistic (seven 
girls, eight boys), who scored five out of five on the ToM total score was compared 
to that of the ToM ‘failers’, the 14 children, five typically developing and nine 
autistic (six girls, eight boys), who scored less than five on the ToM total score. 
The descriptive statistics of these two groups are presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Means, SD and ranges for ToM passers (N = 15) and failers (N = 14) 
 
 ToM passers  ToM failers 
Mean SD Range  Mean SD Range 
Age (months) 79  4.24 73 -86  80 10.46 61-100 
ToM-LC 2 0 2  1.57 0.76 0-2 
ToM-UC 3 0 3  1 0.88 0-2 
ToM total 5 0 5  2.57 1.4 0-4 
LC-Vocab 96.47 12.13 73-120  96.5 16.79 68-120 
LC-Sent 25.07 3.22 19-31  25.14 4.66 14-33 
Epistemic terms 4.53 1.13 3-6  3.21 0.89 2-5 
 
Note. SD: Standard Deviation; ToM-LC: ToM location change; ToM-UC: ToM unexpected 
contents; LC-Vocab: Language Comprehension-Vocabulary; LC-Sent: Language Comprehension 
Sentential. Maximum scores: ToM location change = 2; ToM unexpected contents = 3; ToM total 
score = 5; no vocabulary maximum; Sentence comprehension = 34; Epistemic terms = 6  
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The ToM pass-fail criterion employed here has been used previously in the 
literature (e.g. Ding, Wellman, Wang, Fu & Lee, 2015) and was used in this study 
to clearly distinguish children with a well-developed and consistent ability to 
appreciate others’ false beliefs from those with less advanced (although not 
necessarily absent) abilities in this domain. If those children with a more tenuous 
understanding of others’ mental states are found to perform significantly worse on 
the epistemic modal auxiliary task than the ToM passers, provided they do not 
also perform worse on the measures of general linguistic ability, this would 
suggest that having a fully developed, explicit ToM might be an important 
component in coming to understand epistemic modal auxiliaries. In order to assess 
this possibility, the same analyses were conducted as reported for the comparison 
of the typically developing and autistic children. T-tests demonstrated that the 
ToM passers with their mean epistemic modal score of 4.53 were performing 
significantly above chance (t(14) = 5.28; p < .000; r = .82), whereas the ToM 
failers were not (t(13) = .90; p = .39). An independent t-test demonstrated that the 
difference in epistemic modal auxiliary understanding for these two groups was 
significant (t(27) = -3.48; p = .002; r = .56), suggesting that ToM passers had a 
better understanding of epistemic modals than ToM failers (see also Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of epistemic modal auxiliary scores for ToM passers and failers 
 
However, as the ToM passers and failers had not been matched on age and 
linguistic ability initially, the better performance on the epistemic modal auxiliary 
task of the ToM passers may simply be down to the ToM passers being older or 
generally more verbally able than the ToM failers. If the claim is to be made that 
it is specifically the child’s ToM ability that plays an important role in 
understanding epistemic modal auxiliaries, it thus has to be demonstrated that the 
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ToM passers do not differ from the failers with regards to age or general linguistic 
ability. Independent t-tests demonstrated that this was indeed the case: there were 
no significant differences between the two groups regarding either age (t(27) = 
0.26; p = .80) or general linguistic ability (vocabulary: t(27) = 0.01; p = 1.00; 
sentential language comprehension: t(27) = 0.05; p = .96). The ToM passers were 
thus not significantly older or more linguistically advanced in a general sense than 
the ToM failers. 
 
 
4. Discussion 
 
This study investigated the relationship between ToM and the understanding of 
epistemic modal auxiliaries in Dutch typically developing and autistic children. 
Given the finding from previous research that Dutch five-year-olds demonstrate a 
basic understanding of the Dutch epistemic modal auxiliary system (De Mulder, 
2015), it was expected that the typically developing six-year-olds would be 
capable of understanding the strength distinctions between the various epistemic 
modal auxiliaries. This expectation was indeed borne out by the data: the typically 
developing six-year-olds showed above chance performance in their 
understanding of the epistemic terms. Furthermore, in line with Bascelli and 
Barbieri’s (2002) findings suggesting that Italian children have not yet fully 
understood epistemic modal auxiliaries even at eight years old, the performance 
of the Dutch six-year-olds was not yet at ceiling level, suggesting that their 
understanding of the epistemic modal auxiliary system is still developing at this 
age.  
Not all prior expectations were upheld by the findings of this study, however. 
Given results of previous research (e.g. Ziatas et al., 1998), it was hypothesised 
that the autistic children’s ToM deficit would hinder them in their ability to 
acquire epistemic modal auxiliaries, thereby placing them at a disadvantage as 
compared to typically developing children of the same age. However, the results 
of this study showed a somewhat different picture. Although the typically 
developing children did outperform the autistic children on the ToM tasks, there 
was no significant difference in epistemic modal auxiliary understanding between 
the groups. This finding thus seems to go against the idea that ToM plays an 
important role in the acquisition of mental language. However, on closer 
inspection, it became clear that one autistic child was capable of answering all 
ToM questions correctly whereas five typically developing children were not. The 
initial assumption, that the autistic children would fail the ToM tasks and the 
typically developing children would pass them, thus proved to be false. In order 
to consider whether an advanced understanding of others’ mental states (as 
evidenced by a full score on the ToM tasks), irrespective of clinical diagnosis, 
might be related to epistemic modal auxiliary understanding, the data were further 
analysed by considering the performance of ToM passers as compared to ToM 
failers. Indeed, if the children were divided according to performance on the ToM 
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tasks, the results showed the expected pattern: the ToM passers outperformed the 
failers in their understanding of epistemic modal auxiliaries. That this difference 
between the two groups was not just down to ToM passers’ enhanced general 
cognitive ability is supported by the finding that the ToM passers and failers did 
not differ significantly in age or linguistic ability outside of the mental domain. 
Although, of course, it may be the case that these two groups did differ on 
measures in the linguistic or general cognitive domain that were not assessed in 
this study (e.g. conversational ability, Capps, Kehres & Sigman, 1998), the fact 
that these two groups did not differ significantly in their performance on either the 
receptive vocabulary or the sentence comprehension tasks suggests that the ToM 
passers are not just simply better at any demanding cognitive task than ToM 
failers. This finding thus suggests that the ability to demonstrate a consistent and 
explicit understanding of others’ minds may be an important factor in developing 
an understanding of epistemic modal auxiliaries. After all, this is what 
distinguishes the ToM passers from the failers: those children who were capable 
of predicting and explaining another’s false belief correctly and doing so 
consistently in more than one context (i.e. in both the change of location and 
unexpected contents scenarios) were the ones that demonstrated a higher level of 
epistemic modal auxiliary understanding. Although most of the ToM failers did 
display some understanding of others’ beliefs (only two of the ToM failers, both 
autistic, received zero points for the ToM tasks, all other children had at least one 
false belief question correct), perhaps this more limited understanding of others’ 
mental states does not help the child to the same extent in the acquisition of this 
domain of mental language. In this sense then, what might be relevant to the 
acquisition of vocabulary items that rely on an understanding of the mind is a 
relatively full appreciation of others’ mental states, not just a dawning 
understanding.  
In underscoring the importance of ToM development in the acquisition of 
mental language, these findings are thus in line with much of previous research 
(e.g. De Mulder, 2015; Ifantidou, 2005; Moore et al., 1990; Papafragou, 2001; 
Papafragou & Li, 2001). However, the fact that Ziatas et al. (1998), a study very 
comparable to the current study, obtained somewhat different results requires 
clarification. Whereas Ziatas et al. (1998) demonstrated that typically developing 
children outperformed autistic children in their understanding of mental state 
verbs, the current study did not find a significant difference in epistemic modal 
auxiliary understanding between the two groups.  As both the sample size (12 
autistic children in Ziatas et al. and 10 in the current study) and the number of 
autistic children passing ToM tasks (2 out of 12 in Ziatas et al. and 1 out of 10 in 
this study) were similar, these factors cannot explain the different outcomes. 
However, Ziatas et al. employed one ToM task in which the child only had to 
predict looking behaviour. In the current study, the children received two ToM 
tasks in which children had to predict and explain behaviour, thus providing a 
more stringent measure of ToM. The two autistic children that passed the ToM 
task in Ziatas et al. may thus not have counted as ToM passers had they been 
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assessed in this study. If this analysis is correct, the results of the current study 
and Ziatas et al. (1998) converge: children who have an advanced understanding 
of others’ mental states outperform children with less developed ToM ability 
when it comes to the understanding of mental state language.  
The results of this study thus point to the importance of explicit ToM 
development in the acquisition of mental language. This ability starts to develop 
from around four years old onwards, but, as this study demonstrates, even 
typically developing six-year-olds are not always capable of consistently 
articulating this understanding across different contexts (although all typically 
developing six-year-olds in this sample did display at least some understanding of 
false beliefs). However, this finding should not be taken to say that children under 
four have no understanding of false beliefs. Indeed, various studies have suggested 
that an implicit understanding of others’ false beliefs may already be present in 
infants (e.g. Baillargeon, Scott & He, 2010). However, this knowledge is not 
explicitly available until many years later: children younger than four years old 
cannot call upon this knowledge consciously in order to answer questions that 
require an explicit response (which cannot be due only to verbal limitations, given 
young children’s failure on nonverbal analogues of standard false belief tasks, see 
Call and Tomasello, 1999). The process by which understanding of others’ mental 
states develops thus takes quite a number of years, with the development of 
explicit and consistent understanding extending until the child is at least around 
six years old. Potentially then, it is this advanced understanding that is important 
in helping the child on her way in solving the mental language part of the language 
acquisition puzzle.  
Of course, it should be noted that this claim does not entail that the child’s 
understanding of mental language may not also help her on her way in ToM 
development. Indeed, although previous research suggests that understanding 
other people’s mental states affects the child’s linguistic development, a number 
of studies have demonstrated that language development, particularly the 
acquisition of sentential complementation constructions involving mental state 
verbs like ‘know’ and ‘think’ (see de Villiers, 2005, 2007), plays an important role 
in ToM development (see Astington & Baird, 2005; Milligan, Astington & Dack, 
2007). However, given that differences in epistemic modal auxiliary 
understanding were found to be related to ToM ability in two groups that did not 
differ in general linguistic ability, the current study does underscore the 
importance of having a well-developed, explicit ToM for the child to be able to 
understand epistemic modal auxiliaries. 
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